Wiplinger, F. Metaphysik, Logik, Sprachkritik.--Mück, O. Wahrheit und Verifikation.--Strasser, S. Zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit.--Rivera de Ventosa, E. Dialektik und Dialog.--Schöndorfer, U. Ganzheitliche Erkenntnistheorie.--Lotz, J. B. Denken als Vollzug im Ganzen.--Benedikt, M. Orientierung und Architektonik.--Schaff, A. Ein Marxist liest die Integrale Logik.--Ricoeur, P. Wissenschaft und Ideologie.--Kohlenberger, H. Geschichtsprozess als Integration.--Huber, G. Zur Grundproblematik der philosophischen Anthropologie.--Wisser, R. Schöpfung und Schöpfertum in der Philosophie.--Verosta, S. Zum Verhältnis von Ordnung und Macht.--Schneider, H. Politische Ethik in der gegenwärtigen Normenkrise.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Question of Style in Philosophy and the ArtsJeffrey R. Di LeoThe Question of Style in Philosophy and the Arts, edited by Caroline van Eck, James McAllister and Renée van de Vall; xi & 245 pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, $49.95.The question, “Should philosophers concern themselves with questions of style?” motivates this rich collection of twelve essays on the interrelatedness of content and its formal representation in (...) both philosophical writing and the arts. Alongside issues such as aestheticized forms of philosophizing and the relationship between method and style, there are articles on Heinrich von Kleist’s Marionettentheater, the graphic works of William Hogarth, Alexis de Tocqueville’s use of metaphor and paradox, the use of ellipses in Johannes Kepler’s astronomical theories, and eclecticism in eighteenth-century English architecture.Style has been an explicit concern for historians and theorists of the arts long before it came to the fore in philosophy. The editors think philosophers can learn a lot not only about the concept of style but also about philosophical style by looking into the practices of musicians, architects, and painters and by thinking about how styles are formed, transformed, and understood in the arts. By comparing the arts and philosophy, we can move toward something lacking in contemporary discussions, namely stylistic categories specific to philosophy. Richard Wollheim’s essay, for example, offers many categories appropriate to painting that could be relevant to philosophical writing.A provocative point traced here is that until the end of the eighteenth century, “style” had little to do with the meaning of a work of art—the term merely denoted an artwork’s place in the hierarchy of art. Before 1800, there was hardly a question of choice among styles: contributions to a practice were regarded not as belonging to one style or another, but as falling within or being alien to a practice. Only in the early nineteenth century did style become a key element in the meaning of a work, when it took the place previously occupied by nature, antiquity, or absolute standards of reason. With the traditional bearers of meaning gone, one could no longer look to content for meaning, and artists turned to style to create meaningful art—style being that aspect of writing, painting, or building traditionally associated with ornament, that could be varied without changing the content. Gradually, the “variable” element in art became the prime bearer of meaning.The claim here is that an analogous transition from stylistic monism to pluralism occurred in philosophy about a century after it did in art. This shift away from the monistic geometrical and mathematical standards of philosophical reasoning established in the late sixteenth century was brought about by philosophers such as Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. Lambert Weising suggests that, with Wittgenstein, there is a substitution of style for truth—a point which seems equally true of others, notably Nietzsche. A consequence of this new [End Page 187] pluralism is a loosening of what can be called philosophical reasoning, and an increasing receptiveness to and acceptance of a diversity of philosophical styles. Questions of style do tend to arise in connections with philosophers of the literary sort—Plato or Kierkegaard. Now philosophers have much less difficulty regarding as philosophical a work such as Pascal’s Pensées, which has traditionally been treated more as literature than as philosophy.One of the challenges of this collection is to refute the view of those who deny that the content of their philosophical writing depends at all on style. This would give support to a thesis defended by Martha Nussbaum in this journal in 1983: “No stylistic choice can be presumed to be neutral—not even the choice to write in a flat or neutral style” (p. 146). Beryl Lang, who has addressed this question in other books and articles, argues that style is relevant to all philosophical writing, even that professed to be “style-less.” Lang correctly shows that philosophers’ general disregard for expressiveness, and their belief that the proper philosophical method will lead all who follow it to the same results, has itself become a feature of philosophical writing. So “style-less” writing is a philosophical... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 887 could also be useful in a science course as an outside reading for those interested in expanding their intellectual horizons in an inter· disciplinary way. F. F. CENTORE St. Jerome's College U. of Waterloo, Ontario Die Metaphysik des Thomas von Aquin in historischer Perspektive, ILTeil. Salzburger Studien zur Philosophie, Band 17. By LEO J. ELDERS. Salzburg/Miinchen: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1987. Pp. 331. Paper, DM 54. This (...) is the second half of Elders' metaphysical study as promised in the prior volume (reviewed in THE THOMIST, 50 [1986], 463· 465) on common being. The present book centers on God, in contrast to ens commune. But it strongly renews {pp. 7, 24) the insistence that no Wolffian separation of ontology from philosophical theology is Summa theologiae in showing first that God's existence is not immedi· ately evident to us but needs to be demonstrated (pp. 28-88). It then presents the " five ways " for demonstrating the divine existence, with Latin text and German translation side by side {pp. 89-137). It re· duces other suggested " ways " to some one of the five, or else sets them aside in one manner or another (pp. 137-142). After that it treats the divine attributes according to the ways of negation, causality and eminence {pp. 143-187), and then the naming of God (pp. 189· 221), God's knowledge, life, truth, power and will (pp. 223-275), and :finally the divine action upon creatures (pp. 277-315). This treatment proceeds strictly in the order followed by the Summa theologiae. The book concludes (p. 317) that the philosophical theology of Aquinas is a coherent whole, based upon everyday experience yet for that very reason on principles that are metaphysically evident and ad· mitted by "common sense" (see also pp. 15, 200). The treatment is neatly addressed to the problems that have been under lively discussion during the past few decades, such as the " death of God." These are dealt with against an extensive and admirably detailed historical background stretching from the Greeks to the present day, with wide coverage of secondary literature, thoroughly justifying the book's designation of itself as a study pursued "in historical perspective." However, the advisability of the Summa's order of treatment for a work meant to explain the metaphysical thinking of Aquinas is open to question. Elders (p. 8, n. 3; p. 13, n. 4) is acquainted with the vigor· 338 BOOK REVIEWS ous protests of Gilson and Pegis against reading as philosophy what Aquinas wrote as theology. Yet Elders (p. 8) allows the stand that on the ground of its intrinsic rationality Aquinas would have adhered to the Summa's order even if he had been writing a purely philosophical theology. In the present case, one may strongly object, the result is a way of thinking that dulls sensitivity to the core position of existence in Aquinas' metaphysical thought. The long and checkered history of the notion " common sense " in western philosophy should be enough to dissociate that concept from Thomistic metaphysics, and here the appeal to " everyday experience " as a support calls first for careful analysis of the radically different ways in which existence and nature are originally attained by human cognition. The book finds (p. 101, n. 61), for instance, that in the demonstration of God's existence from motion Aquinas is employing without radical distinction the same principles as Aristotle but is applying them more strictly. The pro· foundly distinctive character of Aquinas' metaphysical acumen is thereby missed. This may be aptly illustrated by one example. The pointed assertion of the Summa contra gentiles (1.9.Inter) that without consideration of the proof for God's existence " omnis consideratio de rebus divinis necessario tollitur," is understood by Elders to mean "... ist jede philosophische Betrachtung des Seienden letztlich grundlos" (p. 89). Yet granting without hesitation that the proof of the divine existence is necessary for understanding metaphysically " that which exists " (das Seiende), one may, against Elders, take the statement of Aquinas at its face value as much more finely pointed. It means what it literally says, namely that things divine cannot be understood apart from consideration of the proof for God's... (shrink)

Vorrede, von T. Pinkus.--Sein und Bewusstsein, von G. Lukács und H.H.Holz.--Gesellschaft und Individuum, von G. Lukács und L. Kofler.--Grundlegendes zu einer wissenschaftlichen Politik, von G. Lukács und W. Abendroth.--Vorläufige Bilanz, von G. Lukács, W. Abendroth und H. H. Holz.--Bibliographie (p. 125-[128]).

The Y chromosomes of most Drosophila species are necessary for male fertility but they are not involved in sex determination. They have many puzzling properties that resemble the effects caused by B chromosomes. Classical genetic and molecular studies reveal substantial affinities between Y and B chromosomes and suggest that the Y chromosomes of Drosophila are not degenerated homologues of the X chromosomes, but rather that their Y chromosomes evolved as specialized supernumeraries similar to classical B chromosomes.

Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary (...) precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework. (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

Eine große Leidenschaft von Siegfried Kracauer war es, mit jüngeren, gleichsam noch unfertigen Denkern zu „symphilosophieren“. Dies hat etwa in den neueren Adorno-Biographien zu vielerlei Spekulationen und mitunter schlüpfrigen Anspielungen auf vermeintliche homoerotische Beziehungen zwischen Kracauer und Adorno geführt – Spekulationen, die sich nur im Deutschen Literaturarchiv überprüfen ließen, da das Material bislang nicht zitiert werden darf. Der Briefwechsel mit Leo Löwenthal legt nahe, dass es sich bei seiner Vorstellung vom „Symphilosophieren“ tatsächlich um eine subtile geistige Homoerotik handelt, mehr aber (...) auch nicht. Geradezu beschwört wird „das Philosophieren zu zweien, das immer und ewig schön“ sei. Am 16. Oktober 1921 schreibt Kracauer: „Träumen Sie nicht auch jeden Menschen in seiner Art vollendet?“ Um der Perfektionierung des Leo Löwenthal willen scheut er auch vor sachlich scharfer Kritik nicht zurück, die sich jedoch mit unverbrüchlicher persönlicher Loyalität paart. Zu den Aspekten, die die frühen Briefe Kracauers so lesenswert machen, gehört es, wie er den jungen Löwenthal von der Bahn eines „wilden“, schwärmerischen Messianismus zu einer säkularen Wahrnehmung religiöser Inhalte zu lenken versucht. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Robert Leo CRITICISM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN SHELLEY'S A DEFENCE OF POETRY IN his "Ode to Liberty" Shelley locates by encircling and enfolding metaphors a mythic Hellenic moment, one in which verse was yet "speechless" and philosophy still burdened with "lidless eyes." Greece— always for Shelley either the displaced Garden of prethematic unity or the mythic dream of integrated civic and aesthetic life—is about to inaugurate Athens and the (...) "wrinkled image" of historical consciousness.1 Poetry, thinking, and the tilling of an earth "to human use" are implicitly related and foreseen as destiny: from their enchanted caves Prophetic echoes flung dim melody. On the unapprehensive wild The vine, the corn, the olive mild, Grew savage yet, to human use unreconciled; And, like unfolded flowers beneath the sea, Like the man's dark thought in the infant's brain, Like aught that is which wraps what is to be, Art's deathless dreams lay veiled by many a vein Of Parian stone; and, yet a speechless child, Verse murmured, and Philosophy did strain Her lidless eyes for thee... (11. 49-60). Shelley could be describing the reading or speaking of a text, for poetic experience is an originating moment which unfolds our reflections and anticipations. Poetry elides speechlessness and the empty gaze. Its goings are all returnings, its experience is always inventive before meanings codify and resolve: "Every original language near to its source," we find in the Defence (p. 279), "is in itself the chaos of a cyclic poem; the copiousness of lexicography and the distinctions of grammar are the works of a later age and are merely the catalogue and the form of the creations of poetry." What was dark to experience is now illumined, 46 John Robert Leo47 as different regions in experience are uncovered or redistributed by language across our shifting horizons. Thus this bringing-foward-intoclarity, this moving of the previously inexpressed into articulation, is the pattern not only behind Shelley's view ofGreece producing a "sun-fire garlanded" Athens (1. 68), but also the more pervasive design describing other regarded experience. James Edie puts it this way: "We... can learn to make distinctions in our experience by attending to differences of meaning which are normally below the level of our own cultural threshold. By attending to a given region of experience, we can lower the differential thresholds already sedimented in our language almost indefinitely and make what was implicit in our experience more and more explicit."2 Edie's comments may be taken as responses to questions emerging from modernist readings of Shelley and other visionary poets—Blake, Hart Crane, or Charles Olson are instances—who sense the poetic project as a criticism of consciousness, within the lived body, as it struggles to make a world. How do language and the imagination consort in the critical regeneration of our lives? In what sorts of ways is renascence the uncovering and unfolding of an indefinite wholeness by the unlayering of fixed habits and attitudes? How does Shelley's Defence of Poetry, both a text on aesthetics and a reading of the world, suggest their alignment? What methods from critical discourse make Shelley's poetics present to our experience and thought? The adjustment of these issues is the task of the remainder of my article. First I examine Shelley's organization of consciousness into "reason" and "imagination" and trace the meanings of these functions in their immediate social context. A brief dispute with the reductive idealism of Platonic tradition allows for my third procedure, which is a phenomenological description of the imaginative field according to Husserl. Finally, I try to explicate Shelley's understanding of imaginative "decentering" within our experience. I Poetry and prose are saturated with references to phenomena. Texts refer to interior and exterior events (memory, rain), which are objects ofandfor consciousness. Shelley grasps this co-givenness of consciousness and world, their correlativity, as a condition revealed and strengthened by metaphor, which itself arrests us as "that of which we are speaking through words."3 But if it is the nature of language to be both perceptual and yet transcendental, both present and absent, it still exists as the imagination's voice in... (shrink)

Let us agree, to begin with, that we are not shown [in Last Judgment], as Life Magazine long ago phrased it, a Saint Bartholomew who "holds his own mortal skin, in which Michelangelo whimsically painted a distorted portrait of himself.”1 The face was sloughed with the rest of the skin and goes with it. What we see is a Saint Bartholomew with another's integument in his hand. We next consider an aspect of the self-portrait which even La Cava left out (...) of account - its relative siting. This has to matter since the portrait lies in the path of Christ's imminent action. More than that, it lies on a diagonal that traverses the fresco like a heraldic bend chief to base - from left top to right bottom. The twofold competence thus assumed by the self-portrait - in its concrete location and in the range of its influence - is something to marvel at. A hangdog face flops to one side, helpless and limp. But the tilt of its axis projected upward across the field strikes the apex of the left-hand lunette, the uppermost point of the fresco. And if, departing once again from the skin's facial axis, we project its course netherward, we discover the line produced to aim straight at the fresco's lower right corner. Such results do not come by chance. To put it literally, letting metaphor fall where it may: it is the extension of the self's axis that strings the continuum of heaven and hell. · 1. Life Magazine, 6 December 1949, p. 45. So also Redig de Campos speaks of the lifeless Apostle's own skin, "dove il Buonarroti ha nascoto un singolare autoritratto..in caricatura tragica della sua 'infinita miseria'" . Tolnay sees the matter correctly: "It is the artist's empty skin which the saint holds in his hand" Leo Steinberg is Benjamin Franklin Professor and University Professor of the History of Art at the University of Pennsylvania. His publications include Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art, Michelangelo's Last Paintings, Borromini's San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, as well as studies of Leonardo, Pontormo, Velazquez, and Picasso. (shrink)

Rewilding is positioned as ‘post’-conservation through its emphasis on unleashing the autonomy of natural processes. In this paper, we argue that the autonomy of nature rhetoric in rewilding is challenged by human interventions. Instead of joining critique toward the ‘managed wilderness’ approach of rewilding, however, we examine the injustices this entails for keystone species. Reintroduction case studies demonstrate how arbitrary standards for wildness are imposed on these animals as they do their assigned duty to rehabilitate ecosystems. These ‘Goldilocks’ standards are (...) predicated on aesthetic values that sanction interventions inconsistent with the premise of animal sovereignty. These include culling, relocations and sterilizations of animals that demonstrate the kind of autonomy championed in rewilding rhetoric. Drawing from Donaldson and Kymlicka’s framework for political animal categories, we conclude by arguing that rewilding needs to re-position itself in one of two ways. Either it should align itself more closely to mainstream conservation and embrace full animal sovereignty without Goldilocks conditions, or it should commit to taking full responsibility for reintroduced animals, including supplementary feeding and care. (shrink)

According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing (...) joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true. (shrink)